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 Drawing comparisons between the case of the West Bank and the American West 
may surprise at first sight. Yet, the West Bank shares enough aspects with the American 
West to justify such a comparison. Both areas lie in an arid zone where irrigated 
agriculture is the sector consuming most water in spite of its generating the least added 
value through that use of water in comparison with other sectors. Both areas witness 
intricate interactions between the irrigating farmers and the political decision makers 
responsible for this allocation of water to persist. Both areas witness claims of water 
scarcity and of an “other” unfairly hoarding huge amounts of water. In the case of the 
West Bank, farmers turn their eyes toward the Israelis who are entitled to 82% of the 
West Bank’s renewable water resources according to the 1995 treaty between Israel and 
the Palestinians. In the case of the American West, the abundant resources lying north of 
the border, in Canada, provide the same attraction.  Such claims shape the perceptions of 
the water users and affect the nature of the policies that can be successful. Indeed, a 
policy will not be successfully applied because it is the most coherent with a drawing 
board rationality that would maximize the profits generated our of water use. A policy 
will rather be successfully implemented because it is perceived as legitimate by the 
community of water users. 
 
 Of course the similarities end here. The American West covers a huge surface 
area that could contain several European states whereas the entire West Bank can fit 
comfortably within the state of Missouri. The American West is part of a sovereign 
federal state whereas the West Bank has a strange status, neither sovereign state nor 
totally occupied militarily by the neighboring state.1 The United States are clearly the 
stronger party when negotiating with Canada concerning water whereas the Palestinians 
are clearly the weaker party when negotiating with Israel. Finally, the technology and the 
type of social organization determining the use and the allocation of water are widely 
different in both countries. 
  
 A much advertised element of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict concerns water. The 
importance of water was clearly recognized when it appeared as one of the five topics 
that were left for final status talks at the time when the interim Israeli-Palestinian 
agreements were concluded. Much literature has been devoted to the issue of water 
sharing between Israel and the Palestinians, essentially portraying it as a binational 
competition pitting Israel on one side and the Palestinians on the other. This view 
certainly finds support in the 1995 agreement that determined how the contents of the 
three aquifers lying in the West Bank would be shared during the interim period between 
Israelis and Palestinians. Although the agreement refers to millions of cubic meters, it 
expresses in total a ratio of 82% for Israelis and 18% for the Palestinians.2 These figures 
                                                        
1 Note that Israel never annexed the West Bank as it did the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. Thus the 
Jericho area does not lie within the state of Israel even according to Israel itself. 
2 Israeli-Palestinian agreement, Washington, 28 September 1995, Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs, Annex 
10, paragraph 20, article 40 of the Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs. 
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have been contested by several Palestinian researchers who say the contents of the 
eastern aquifer were overestimated at the time of concluding the agreement and the 
quantities which Palestinians are expected to draw there are unachievable.3  
 
The perception of the competition over water as a binational one also surfaces 
from the military orders concerning water in the Occupied Territories that were put out in 
the wake of the occupation. On 15 August 1967, Military Order no 92 granted complete 
authority over all issues concerning water to an Israeli officer named by the Area 
Commander. The following fall, Military Order no 158 of 19 November 1967 submitted 
the construction of any new water installations to the prior obtainment of a permit and 
allowed the confiscation of any water resource for which no permit existed. One year 
later, Military Order no 291 of 19 December 1968 invalidated all prior and existing 
arrangements of disputes concerning water.4 Military orders remained in force even after 
the conclusion of the interim agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. Indeed, 
according to article VI.9 of the 4 May 1994 agreement signed in Cairo, which came to be 
known as Oslo II, the laws and Military Orders in force before the signature of the 
agreement will remain in force unless they are amended or abrogated in the manner 
specified in the agreement.5 Thus, the agreement of the joint water committee is 
necessary, and this committee functions on the basis of consensus and is half composed 
of Israelis and half of Palestinians. 
 
These military orders have often been portrayed as an example of Israeli 
appropriation of complete control over water in the Palestinian Territories. These orders 
have granted Israel extensive powers over water and have allowed the situation that was 
officially recognized in 1995 whereby most of the renewable water of the West Bank 
aquifers is used by Israelis inside the Green Line and in settlements. They do not account 
however for the degree of freedom, no matter how limited, which the Palestinians have 
regarding water management. 
 
Close scrutiny of the many competitions, cooperations and conflicts that surround 
water issues in Israel and The West Bank, reveals that what appears initially as a simple 
binational competition is in fact a maze of interactions. This paper proposes to examine 
how water access, water use and water allocation is determined as far as the Palestinians 
are concerned. Water is essentially used for irrigation or for domestic use in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. Industrialization remains quite limited and does not claim a 
significant proportion of water used in these territories. This paper will first of all sketch 
the situation for irrigation. It will then sketch the situation for domestic use. It will look 
briefly at examples of competitions and conflicts for water and will illustrate the many 
interactions among actors deploying strategies over widely differing scales. It will bring 
                                                        
3 Communication given by Dr. Fawzi Naji, political advisor of the PWA, PASSIA roundtable , 4 February 
1999. 
4 Israeli Millitary Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank 1967-1992, compiled by Jamil Rabah and 
Natasha Fairweather, Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, Jerusalem, 2nd edition, 1995,   
5 Treaty 
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in the international dimension of these competitions and conflicts for water only after the 
local and national dimensions will have been examined. Finally, it will highlight various 
dangerous mechanisms that are especially fuelled by the fact that the competition for 
water in the area has so often been portrayed as a mere binational competition. 
 
 
Water for Irrigation 
 
Irrigation is not very much developed in the West Bank. According to ARIJ, only 
6.0% of the cultivated area of the West Bank was irrigated in 1994.6 Yet, examining how 
irrigation water is accessed, what rules determine that it should be devoted to that 
purpose and how it should be allocated is important. Indeed, 65% of the water used by 
the Palestinians is devoted to irrigation.7 In 1999, the Palestinian Water Authority was 
recognizing in its strategy document the need to solve legal, political and cultural 
complications concerning the fact that it was going to take over what it called “the 
established private water rights”.8 Close scrutiny reveals that much of this irrigation 
water is regulated according to communal property regimes, not private ones. The 
difference is important because transforming a private property into a public property is 
much simpler than transforming a communal property into a public one. Moreover, the 
transformation contemplated here goes beyond property itself. It proposes to change 
existing property regimes. 
  
A property regime is the set of arrangements developed by a human group to 
control its use of a natural resource.  A property rights regime includes both the property 
rights and the property regulations.  The property rights include the bundles of 
entitlements that define the rights and duties of the owners concerning the use of the 
resource. The property regulations determine the manner in which these rights and 
responsibilities are exercised.9 Within a private property regime, ownership of a resource 
is individual. The owner has the right to use the resource in a socially acceptable way and 
to control the access to the resource. The owner also has the responsibility to avoid 
socially unacceptable uses of the resource. Within a communal property regime, 
ownership of a resource is collective. It can include the inhabitants of a village, or a 
group of families within a village for example. The collective owner has the right to 
exclude the non-owners from accessing or using the resource. The collective owner also 
has crucial responsibilities: maintaining the infrastructure linked to the resource and 
limiting the rate of utilization of the resource so as to make its use sustainable. 
                                                        
6 Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem, Water Resources and Irrigated Agriculture in the West Bank, 
Bethlehem, The West Bank, March 1998, p.94. 
7 Strategy for Water Management in The West Bank, Palestinian National Authority, Palestinian Water 
Authority, , January 1999, p. 3.  
8 Ibid., p.9. 
9 Susan Hanna, “Property Rights, People and the Environment”, Beijer Reprint Series, no 74, reprint from 
Getting Down to Earth, edited by R. Costanza, O. Segura and Juan Martinez-Alier, Island Press, 
Washington, DC, 1996, p.381. 
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 Much research has been devoted in the past twenty years to the benefits and 
disadvantages incurred by communal property regimes. Much attention has been brought 
to the fact that irrigation communities using communal property regimes often prove 
surprisingly resilient and contribute overall to a significant share of food production via 
irrigation around the planet. “Local irrigation organizations are exclusive in membership, 
territorial in defense of resources, resistant to outside intervention, and resilient in the 
face of change. Restricted membership, however, sometimes includes local elites and 
excludes less powerful classes, and members’ shares in common resources are often 
proportional to their relative power, wealth and status.”10 This observation by Jonathan 
Mabry certainly holds true in The West Bank. Customary oral institutions of communal 
property over water determine water management to this day in much of The West Bank. 
The persistence of these institutions in spite of decades of military occupation is a credit 
to the strength of Palestinian civil society and should certainly not be interpreted as a sign 
of backwardness. It shows us that grassroot regimes are capable of producing social 
capital to this day.11 They still have the ability to produce social control over how a 
resource is accessed, how it is allocated and how it is used. These communal property 
regimes are generally perceived as legitimate by the Palestinian villagers and are 
therefore respected. This stands in sharp contrast with the public property regimes 
governing reticulation networks for example, where illegal connections are numerous.  
 
The communal property regimes do contribute great advantages in terms of water 
management, but they are not without disadvantages. The type of regimes used to 
manage wells and springs devoted to irrigation will now be examined. 
  
 
 Water from Springs 
 
 The West Bank contains 527 springs the flow of which varies greatly. Some 
springs, especially small ones are considered the private property of the spring owner. 
Some are considered the property of one family that irrigates from it. Some, such as the 
one that flows inside Salfeet, are entirely harnessed by the municipality to feed the 
reticulation system bringing drinking water to houses for domestic use. Yet, most 
sizeable springs are the object of common property regimes and are used for irrigation. 
The regimes that govern them have been devised and have evolved over centuries. They 
vary from one spring to the other, yet share some common characteristics. The flow of 
                                                        
10 Jonathan B. Mabry, “The Ethnology of Local Irrigation”, in: Canals and Communities Small Scale 
Irrigation Systems, Arizona Studies in Human Ecology, The University of Arizona Press, Tucson, ed.: 
Jonathan B. Mabry, 1996,  p.23 
11 We use here the definition of social capital as put out by Elinor Ostrom, i.e. the potential and self-
organizing power of a community. Social capital may be built by establishing rules specifying who will be 
responsible for giving orders or for undertaking certain activities, and when and how these activities will be 
undertaken. Social capital is multiform and may consist of the improvement of the manner in which 
common tasks are carried out. See: Elinor Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation 
Systems, Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, California, 1992, p.30. 
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the spring is generally allocated according to a rotation in time. A shareholder's water day 
comes every six, seven or eight days depending on the spring. If a village contains 
several springs, the rotation may be different from one spring to the other. Often, the 
number of water days is the same as the number of clans (groups of families) that own 
land irrigated by that spring. The flow during the first water day may thus be divided 
among twenty persons whereas the flow during the second water day may be divided 
among many more or many less shareholders. The length in time of the water share may 
be the same for all the shareholders within the same day or it may vary among them. 
Exchanges of water shares may occur, especially among the shareholders of the same day 
that come from the same family. 
 
 Often, institutions nested in one another appear clearly. For example, an oral, 
informal institution governs one spring in a village. The shareholders of that spring may 
include only a group of families in the village. The others have no right to irrigation 
water although they are always allowed to come and fill bottles for domestic use. Within 
the group of shareholders, subgroups often exist who are composed of the families that 
share a water day. Any conflict among the members of that subgroup would be resolved 
among them, without involving the rest of the spring shareholders. 
 
 These informal oral institutions often exist in villages that are connected to a 
reticulation network operated by the municipality. The property regime applying to the 
reticulation network is completely independent from that applying to the spring. An 
essential characteristic of the common property institutions governing the springs is their 
capacity to prevent their own growth. This is essential in order to ensure that a sufficient 
share of water will remain for the farmer. Thus, one can sometimes see a refugee camp 
on one side of a valley facing an old village on the other side. The old landed families of 
the village have all of the irrigation shares and the refugees are only allowed to fill bottles 
of water at the spring. As the phenomenon of water tankers has grown and as such 
tankers can draw sizeable amounts of water, the village often now charges the tankers 
that fill up at their spring. This shows that a customary institution is not synonymous with 
a static institution. An adaptation (charging the water tankers) occurred when the need 
was felt to prevent the growth of the access to the spring water. The manner in which 
springs are shared is never equal, but is generally felt as legitimate by the population that 
lives around the spring. The rules determining how water is allocated are therefore 
scrupulously respected and water theft is rare. 
 
 Each of the institutions governing the common property of a spring exists entirely 
independently from the others. They show some general common characteristics simply 
because they originated and developed in a similar context. Yet, each is a home grown 
grassroot institution, which explains why none has spelled out identical rules as an other 
one. Of course, each of these institution functions independently from the Palestinian 
Authority and expects to keep on functioning this way. The Israelis have essentially put 
limitations on how the Palestinians could develop their water by submitting the building 
of any infrastructure to the obtention of a permit for example. They never interfered with 
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the manner in which they decided to share the water among themselves. So a spring 
shareholder generally expects the Palestinian Authority to deliver potable water through a 
reticulation network, but does not expect the same authority to meddle with the property 
regime to which his spring is submitted. 
 
 
 Water from Wells 
 
 In 1990, Hisham Awartani was reporting that of the 364 Palestinian wells in use 
in the West Bank, only 38 were devoted to domestic consumption. The rest were used for 
irrigation.  Similarly, he was counting 1791 Palestinian wells in use in the Gaza Strip, of 
which only 49 were used only for domestic consumption.12 A quota was applied to the 
wells used for irrigation, but no quota was applied for those used for domestic purposes. 
Awartani’s sample revealed that 38% of the irrigation wells had pumped less than their 
quota in 1990. Mechanisms other than the quotas were actually limiting the pumping for 
irrigation although Awartani did not choose to investigate them. Each of these wells is 
still the object of private property. The farmers who need irrigation water buy it from the 
well owner in a monopoly situation. The network of pipes generally link his field to one 
well only and does not allow him to choose his supplier. Every well uses its owns rules to 
decide on the priority use of the water, on its price and on its allocation.13 Often, no rule 
determine which crops should receive irrigation water as a priority, no rule determines 
which price should be paid for the water nor which quantities should be sold. All of this 
is left to a negotiation between the farmer and the well owner. 
 
 Most wells still in use appeared rather late in the West Bank as the technology to 
drill through such a rocky soil and the capital to exploit it only arrived in the late fifties 
and the early sixties. The well owners were those who had had the capital to have the 
well drilled. They proceeded to sell the water at whatever price they could, as a private 
good. The institutions governing irrigation wells are informal and oral. Like the 
institutions governing springs, they escape the control of the Palestinian Authority. The 
only control they are submitted to is that of the quota for extraction. This was imposed by 
the Israelis and is now implemented by the Palestinian Water Authority. The latter does 
not control the price at which they sell the water nor the type of crops they sell it for. The 
Israelis never interfered with the manner in which the Palestinians distributed their 
irrigation wells' water among themselves. So any interference from the Palestinian 
Authority would not be welcome by the well owners. 
 
 
                                                        
12 Hisham Awartani, Artesian Wells in The West Bank: Present Status and Future Aspirations, Palestinian 
Hydrology Group, Jerusalem, 1992. 
13 Julie Trottier, Hydropolitics in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, PASSIA, Jerusalem, Dec 1999. 
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 Difficulties Arising 
 
 When J. Mabry reflected on the remarkable resilience of small, locally built, 
farmer managed systems facing shifts in political economy, he wrote “[t]he solidarity and 
success of local irrigation communities and water-user associations is correlated with 
their ability to limit growth such that membership provides a secure share of water 
resources and protects them from “free-riding” outsiders.”14 
 
 Of course, in such systems, individuals are not equal facing water. A “water-rich” 
group and a “water poor” group systematically surface. In such systems, water is not a 
public good. Yet this boundary drawn by the water using community, which removes 
water from the realm of public goods, generates another public good in exchange: the 
security of its members through the resiliency of their water management institution. 
Within the irrigating community, abundance is spread in the same fashion as scarcity. 
Inequalities persist during droughts as they do at any other time. The small size of the 
community often ensures that mechanisms will be enforced in times of drought in order 
to protect the weakest members. This is not carried out of humanitarian concern but 
rather because the community is so small that no member can be completele overlooked. 
Irrigation networks need maintenance and lack of maintenance in one part of the network 
is susceptible to affect the entire set of users. 
 
 Respect of local institutions often prevents any sectorial reallocation of water 
from irrigation to domestic use in cities for example. Treating water as a public good 
often leads us to call for such a reallocation on the ground of sound economic use. The 
full impact of such a reallocation must be evaluated though. It would entail the 
disappearance of local institutions whose resilience has ensured the security of their 
communities while simultaneously disrupting the livelihoods of these community 
members. What may sound like a sound economic option on a greater scale can prove to 
be a disaster on a smaller scale. 
 
 Of course, alternative sources of income can be generated as a counterweight 
measure when a reallocation is considered. New incomes may be generated through new 
activities. The livelihoods then are not disrupted, but the local institutions are and so is 
the security they provided to their members. This contributes largely to explain both the 
amazing resiliency of local water management institutions and the fact they become 
enmeshed in many facets of social control. 
 
 Water being a public good is now a notion that has made its way into most states’ 
legislation.  Yet, social control and security are also worthy public goods. A dual choice 
implying that only one of them can exist at the expense of the other cannot represent a 
successful development option. 
 
                                                        
14 Jonathan B. Mabry, op.cit., p.13. 
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 These issues are quite salient in The West Bank now. No institution exists that 
can proceed with a sectorial reallocation of water from irrigation to domestic use. The 
fact that most of the water available to the Palestinians is controlled by common property 
regimes and escapes the control of the Palestinian Authority makes such transfers 
impossible. Moreover, any such transfer would affect negatively the capacity of grassroot 
institutions to produce social control and security. This difficulty is compounded by the 
fact that the “water-rich” members of irrigation communities often constitute the old, 
landed Palestinian elite. The new elite of the Palestinian Authority is often constituted of 
people whose family origin is in what is now Israel. The capital of this new elite is 
invested in activities, such as the casino in Jericho, that require water for domestic use, 
not for irrigation. The competition between water for irrigation and water for domestic 
use therefore often pits the new Palestinian elite against the old Palestinian elite. 
 
 
Water for Domestic Use 
 
 As opposed to the water used for irrigation, which is managed entirely 
independently from the Palestinian Authority, much of the nascent state's involvement 
appears in the management of domestic water. In 1999, 35% of Palestinian used water 
was devoted to domestic use. The earlier sections showed how the Palestinian Water 
Authority faces local social forces, the spring shareholders and the well owners, if it 
wants to spell out the rules regarding the water now devoted to irrigation. Examination of 
the management of the water devoted to domestic use now shows the Palestinian Water 
Authority facing both national and local social forces. Many Palestinian villages and 
towns have a water reticulation network that is run by the municipality which belongs to 
the Ministry of Local Governments. The Palestinian Water Authority's plan, to build five 
regional water utilities throughout The West Bank, would wrestle the control of 
reticulation networks out of that ministry. This uphill battle is not yet won. 
 
 Many Palestinian communities are not yet connected to any reticulation system. 
The Palestinian Water Authority was reporting 151 such communities in 1999. The 
inhabitants of such villages purchase their water from water tankers, and so do the many 
inhabitants of towns and villages whose reticulation networks fail to provide a reliable 
supply of water. Extending its control over the price at which the water tankers sell the 
resource and to control the quality of what they sell represents another uphill battle for 
the Palestinian Water Authority. 
 
 In January 2001, the water tanker providing water to the village of Aqraba in the 
West Bank invoked the fact that a ditch had been dug in the road linking it to the 
neighboring village where it purchased the water as well as a price hike on that water in 
order to double its price. The inhabitants of Aqraba accepted it as a sad result of the 
uprising. Enquiry showed that the neighboring village had never hiked its price and that 
the trip to that village had only been lengthened by 50 meters. In fact, no control exists 
over the price practice by the tankers nor over the quality of the water they deliver. 
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Competitions and Conflicts over Water 
 
 Joel Migdal’s State-in-Society model is very useful in order to examine the 
interactions between the Palestinian Authority and the various social forces that attempt 
to control water management in The West Bank.15 In this model, the state is viewed in 
dual terms: the “idea of the state” and the “practices of the state”. Often, a state’s 
practices contradict its official policy. “(...) the state-in-society approach points 
researchers to the process  of interaction of groupings with one another and with those 
whose actual behavior they are vying to control or influence. (...) The dynamic process 
changes the groupings themselves, their goals, and, ultimately, the rules they are 
promoting.”16 Migdal developed his model essentially in order to understand the states 
that arose from decolonization. New state leaders strove to impose one set of rules over 
the entire national territory. Their success has generally been elusive as formal and 
informal social organizations were reluctant at giving up their ability to devise rules. 
Instead, they joined forces with the parts of the state and developed practices 
contradicting the official laws and regulations of the state.17 
 
 This is exactly what happened in Jericho. In 1999, 943 persons had water rights 
over the Ein Sultan Spring.18 These water shares were measured in time and concerned 
the length of time during which water was deviated, through the irrigation network, up to 
the plot of the water shareholder. These water shares varied greatly in size, from 32 hours 
a week for a very “water-rich” shareholder to  two and a half minutes a week for a rather 
poor water shareholder. Ein Sultan Spring’s flow was estimated to be 680 cubic meter an 
hour in 1998. The spring has traditionally served the inhabitants’ domestic needs as much 
as they wished and the leftover water was channelled to the various plots of land via the 
irrigation network. The domestic use had long been negligible given the small population 
and the abundant flow of the spring. The share of water pumped by the municipality 
towards domestic needs reached an all time high of 300 cubic meters an hour in 1999. 
Indeed, the town’s population had boomed with the arrival of the Palestinian Authority 
and the 1997 census recorded 14674 inhabitants. The farmers were still receiving the 
same water shares in terms of time, but much less of the spring’s flow was allotted to 
them during that time. Jericho is a rare instance where the farmers do not control 
themselves the various deviations that will lead water to one plot or another. Instead, 
qanawatis who are hired by the municipality cycle along the various channels in order to 
proceed to the various openings and closures of the channels and thereby direct the water 
according to the schedule recorded in the municipality. 
 
 The farmers with the water shares can be considered roughly as the old landed 
elite, whose families were already living in Jericho before Israel ever came into 
existence. The new inhabitants who were creating an increased pressure on the spring’s 
                                                        
15 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
16 Ibid., p. 23. 
17 Ibid. p.49. 
18 Julie Trottier, op.cit., p.86. 
 12
water can be considered roughly as the new elite, whose capital was invested essentially 
in services, the most obvious ones being the casino and the hotels that sprouted up after 
1994. 
 
 The farmers reacted to the situation by creating the Ein Sultan Water’s Users 
Association (ESWUA) upon the occasion of an IFAD (International Fund for Agriculture 
Development) funded project.19 They elected as a secretary general Daoud Erekat, a very 
respected and old time member of the PLO, who happened to be the cousin of Saeb 
Erekat, the Minister of Local Governments. The ESWUA obtained in 1998 decree no 38, 
signed by Y. Arafat, which grants it the responsibility of providing the Jericho Area with 
the necessary water in terms of drinking and irrigation water needs. This decree, 
published in Arabic, was in flagrant contradiction with the Palestinian water law in 
preparation, available in English. It reflected a compromise that the Palestinian Authority 
had to accept in order to appease a local social force, that of the Jericho landed elite, 
which wanted to secure its allocation of water for irrigation. The fact that the 
municipality declared in 1999 that it simply did not recognize this decree shows how far 
the practices of various state institutions can contradict each other, especially when the 
state is only building itself. 
 
 Migdal built his state-in-society model partly because he found Shils’ model of 
center and periphery lacking. Indeed, Shils' model does not allow to understand the 
impact the periphery may have on the center. The periphery is rather presented as an 
amorphous and passive mass which only awaits influence by the centre. This is far from 
corresponding to reality. A nascent state faces many institutions that are already well 
established. These are social forces that react to whatever influence and control the 
nascent state tries to achieve. The various institutions of the state have to strike whatever 
compromise they can with these social forces. 
 
 The Palestinian state does not exist yet and its construction will have to go 
through all of these state and society interactions just like every other state born out of 
decolonization has had to do. A crucial competition has been waged in the West Bank 
since the arrival of the Palestinian Authority: who will be allowed to spell out the rules 
over how water is managed. Customary oral institutions have been spelling out these 
rules for much of the water now used by Palestinians. The Palestinian Authority cannot 
ignore these institutions. The present rebellion against the occupation has temporarily 
obscured this fact. The casino was bombed in the fall of 2000 and was no longer 
operating in 2001. The pressure on the water of Ein Sultan’s Spring had receded and the 
farmers were obtaining more water within their share time. The issue of who should be 
allowed to determine how much water should be devoted to irrigation and how much to 
domestic use will unavoidably arise again in the future. 
 
                                                        
19 A much more detailed account of the Jericho water competitions is given in Julie Trottier, Ibid., pp.85-
94. 
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 In Gaza, the Palestinian Authority has had much more fruitful interactions with 
farmers in order to bring in the nascent state’s presence in determining which rules were 
to be used concerning water. The drilling of illegal wells proliferated in the year 
following the arrival of the Palestinian Authority. The increasing salinity of the 
groundwater in the Gaza strip shows how overpumping is rampant. Yet, seemingly in 
spite of all environmental common sense, the Palestinian Water Authority decided to start 
allocating permits for digging wells. Drilling a well in such a sandy soil is very easy and 
the authority was not in  a position to apply a sanction to those who were doing so. 
Instead, it chose to examine requests for drilling permits and to meet farmers introducing 
such requests. The Water Authority employee would visit the field with the farmer and 
would try to find with him another solution than drilling a new well. In doing this, the 
Palestinian Water Authority started interacting with these very social forces Migdal refers 
to. The local social forces obtained a change from the nascent state as it decided to stop 
its freeze on drilling permits. But the water authority succeeded in introducing itself 
among the actors that spell out the rules on how water is managed. 
 
 
Bringing in the International Dimension 
 
 The international dimension of the competition for water in The West Bank can 
only be considered against the backdrop of these other competitions opposing the 
Palestinian Authority and local social forces or opposing the Palestinian Water Authority 
and other ministries within the Palestinian Authority. Each of the local social forces 
mentioned earlier may at any time harness an alliance with an actor on the international 
scene in order to strengthen its position when facing the Palestinian Authority. This 
explains the sad waste that occurred when two pipelines where laid in parallel between 
Bethlehem and Hebron in 1998-1999. One was to be controlled by the Palestinian Water 
Authority and was funded by USAID whereas the other was to be controlled by the 





 The perception of the water situation in The West Bank as a mere binational 
competition pitting Palestinians against Israelis has brought about the existence of several 
dangerous mechanisms. 
 
 Pumping more water from Palestinian wells has grown to be considered a 
nationalist act. A European Investment Bank funded drilling project in the West Bank has 
now brought about the withdrawal of water at a rate such that it threatens the 
sustainability of the water resources. 
 
 Blaming the occupation as the only source of water problems for the Palestinians 
has prevented any examination of the processes whereby the local social forces involved 
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in water management could be integrated within the Palestinian Authority institutions. 
This is the very process of state building. It is painfully slow and requires long 
negotiations with the local informal institutions. 
 
 Local actors have been harnessing international donors to preserve their power 
over water, to preserve their capacity to spell out the rules. This also has participated to 





 This paper aimed to highlight the need to understand the maze of  interactions 
over many scales: local, national and international, concerning water management. These 
interactions are all at work simultaneously when a water conflict emerges. Focusing on 
one dimension, whether it be the international one or the local one, prevents us from 
perceiving many crucial cooperations or related conflicts that must be incorporated into 
any successful conflict resolution scheme. The various cooperations can be used as assets 
and the various competitions should be spotted early, when there is still time to turn them 
into cooperations rather than conflicts. 
 
 Any successful water management in The West Bank will largely depend on the 
recognition of the customary institutions involved in spelling out the rules concerning 
how water can be used, how it can be allocated and how it can be accessed. Any 
successful construction of a democratic Palestinian state will largely depend on how the 
Palestinian Authority manages to negotiate with these institutions and strike agreements 
that will benefit all parties. 
 
 Exporting an American water management system to the West Bank could not be 
successful because the power configuration concerning water is so different in the 
American West. However, the methodologies developed to explore the policy impact in 
either area can prove useful in the other. Such methodology needs to allow multiscalar 
analysis. It needs to allow the exploration of the intricate interactions between irrigators 
and policy makers and it needs to account for the role played by the relation to water in 
the structure of society. 
 
 
 
